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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The case of R. (Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilisation Embryology 
Authority (and Secretary of State for Health) [2005] 2 A.C. 5611 
(“Quintavalle”) presents a handful of legal problems. The provisions of 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended, the 
“1990 Act”)2 were interpreted very widely to allow a mother to select 
embryos for implantation according to her tissue-match preferences. 
This right is now enshrined into law: 
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 
 
Schedule 2: Activities that may be licenced under the 1990 Act. 
 
Paragraph 1ZA(1): A licence…cannot authorise the testing of an embryo, 
except for one or more of the following purposes: 
 
(d) in a case where a person (“the sibling”) who is the child of the persons 
whose gametes are used to bring about the creation of the embryo (or of 
either of those persons) suffers from a serious medical condition which 
could be treated by umbilical cord blood stem cells, bone marrow or other 
tissue of any resulting child, establishing whether the tissue of any resulting 
child would be compatible with that of the sibling.
3
 
 
                                                          
* Senior Lecturer in Law, The University of Derby, United Kingdom. 
 1 R (Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilisation Embryology Authority (and Secretary of State for 
Health), [2005] 2 A.C. 561 (H.L.). 
 2 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.).   
 3 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 2008, c. 22, § 11, sch. 2 (Eng.). 
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The biggest legal query to arise from the case is the inevitable harvest 
of babies, toddlers and very young children for their bone marrow. This 
non-therapeutic procedure has never been authorised by the courts and 
the welfare test under section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989 would no 
doubt require some form of physical or psychological benefit to the 
donor child (which is not easy to prove in a baby or a toddler).4 There 
is an additional ethical problem in that embryos can now be created 
specifically for the purposes of harvest. There is nothing new in 
conceiving children to meet the desires of their parents (e.g. to take over 
the family business, to keep the older sibling company, etc.) but the 
screening technology was not designed to create embryos specifically 
for participation in non-therapeutic medical procedures after birth. In 
addition, the 1990 Act was composed strictly in light of its controversial 
nature but its wide interpretation by the lords surprised many, and what 
of the embryos that do not provide a tissue match? There is an embryo 
wastage issue that was not addressed by the lords despite embryos 
enjoying a good deal of protection in law.5 
 
This article unpacks the judicial story behind Quintavalle  to reveal 
how the strict provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990 - namely ‘suitable condition’ under schedule 2 paragraph 
1(1)(a) and ‘treatment services’ and ‘assisting’ under section 2(1) - were 
widely misinterpreted to introduce the social selection of embryos into 
law.6 The legal loopholes created by the judgment (embryo wastage, 
welfare, eugenics and the legality of child harvest in particular) are also 
identified. It will be concluded that screening for a tissue match is social 
selection despite arguments to the contrary and that parents are not yet 
entitled in law to harvest a very young child for bone marrow, making 
the creation of a saviour sibling under the 1990 Act as a result of 
Quintavalle ultimately futile. 
 
II. THE NEED FOR A SAVIOUR SIBLING 
 
The judgment in Quintavalle came about as a result of the swift 
technological developments in fertility treatment. Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) was developing during the eighties to screen 
embryos created for genetic diseases.7 The early embryo is biopsied (i.e. 
                                                          
 4 The Human Tissue Act 2004 allows for the storage and use of materials from children 
under section 2, but not removal. This is left to the common law. Human Tissue Act, 2004, c. 
30 (Eng.). 
 5 Embryos created during fertility treatment only tend to be frozen for future use when the 
couple are genuinely struggling to conceive, leading to an increased wastage of healthy 
embryos. Human Tissue Act, 2004, c. 30 (Eng.). 
 6 See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37 (Eng.).   
 7 Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD or PIGD) in the context of international 
reproductive medicine, Medica, http://origin-www.medica-tradefair.com/cgi-bin/md_medica/
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one or two cells are removed) and examined for the presence of x-linked 
genetic diseases. The first live birth occurred in 1990.8 The 
breakthrough was heralded as an end to the stressful combination of 
fertility treatment and abortion due to defective embryos.9 PGD has now 
developed to detect non-gender related genetic diseases and more 
recently, late-onset adult diseases such as cancer.10 Screening for a 
Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) tissue match was added to the 
process to allow parents to find a cure for an existing child (often 
referred to as Preimplantation Tissue Typing or PTT).11 Adam Nash 
became the first ever tissue matched sibling to be born in Chicago, USA 
in 2001 when his umbilical cord blood cured his sister of the autosomal 
recessive disorder fanconi anaemia.12 Dr Yury Verlinsky explained the 
advantages of the treatment in his project report: 
 
These new indications make PGD a genuine alternative to conventional 
prenatal diagnosis, providing patients with important prospects not only to 
avoid an inherited risk without facing termination of pregnancy, but also to 
establish a pregnancy with particular genetic parameters that benefit an 
affected member of the family.
13
 
 
The introduction of Preimplantation Tissue Typing (PTT)14 changed 
everything. Fertility treatment was no longer a means to conceive a 
healthy baby, it was an opportunity to place an order for a particular 
baby. The academic commentary was littered with concerns about sex 
                                                          
lib/pub/tt.cgi/PGD_May_Pose_Risks.html?oid=28445&lang=2&ticket=g_u_e_s_t  (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2017). 
 8 The first successful project was published in: Handyside, A.H., Pattinson, J.K., Penketh, 
R.J. et al., Biopsy of Human Preimplantation Embryos and Sexing by DNA Amplification, 333, 
The Lancet, 347-9 (1989); Handyside, A.H., Lesko, J.G., Tarin, J.J. et al., Birth of a Normal 
Girl After In Vitro Fertilisation and Preimplantation Diagnosis Testing for Cystic Fibrosis, 
327(13) New Eng. J. Med. 905 (1992). 
 9 Daar, J.F. ART and the Search for Perfectionism: on Selecting Gender, Genes, and 
Gametes, 9 J. of Gender, Race and Justice 241, 247 (2005). 
 10 Alan R. Thornhill & Karen Snow, Molecular Diagnostics in Preimplanation Genetic 
Diagnosis, J. MOL. DIAGN. Feb. 2002, at 12.  
 11 Ilan Tur-Kaspa & Roohi Jeelani, Clinical Guidelines for IVF and PGD for HLA 
Matching, 30 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 115, 115 (2015).  
 12 Verlinsky, Y., Rechitsky, S., Schoolcraft, W. et al., Preimplantation Diagnosis for 
Fanconi Anemia Combined with HLA Matching, 285 Journal of the American Medical 
Association 24, 3130 (2001). 
 13 Id. 
 14 HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, Pre-implantation Tissue Typing 
(‘Saviour Siblings’), available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/preimplantation-tissue-
typing.html. 
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selection and eugenics (such as perfect pitch or intelligence)15 but no 
such ‘master race’ has emerged despite PGD/PTT being largely 
unregulated in the United States.16 The United Kingdom was due to 
jump on the bandwagon, and the one thing it can do better than any other 
country is regulate. 
 
III. MR & MRS HASHMI AND THE HIGH COURT
17
 
 
Mr.  and Mrs. Hashmi in the United Kingdom learnt of the 
breakthrough in Chicago, USA.18 Their son Zain, the fourth of five 
children, was suffering from beta thalassemia major and required a daily 
combination of drugs and regular blood transfusions.19 A stem cell 
transplant from umbilical cord blood or bone marrow was his only 
chance of a cure.20 Mrs Hashmi already had three non-compatible 
children older than Zain, had conceived after Zain for a matching sibling 
but on finding out it was not a match underwent an abortion, and gave 
birth to another child who was not a tissue match before she asked the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFE Authority) to 
issue a licence for a course of PTT to create a match for Zain.21 The 
HFE Authority announced its historic decision to licence PTT in a press 
release as long as any embryo created for the purpose of providing cord 
blood would itself be at risk from the same disorder: 
 
2001 Policy: 
 
(a) the condition of the affected child should be severe or life-threatening, 
of a sufficient seriousness to justify the use of PGD; 
(b) the embryos conceived in the course of this treatment should themselves 
be at risk from the condition by which the existing child is affected; 
                                                          
 15 The following articles address the issue of eugenics: Caplan, A.L. What is Immoral About 
Eugenics?, 319 British Medical Journal 1284 (1999); Robertson, J.A., Extending 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Medical and Non-Medical Uses, 29 Journal of Medical 
Ethics 213 (2003) Extending Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: The Ethical Debate, 18 
Human Reproduction 3, 465-471 (2003) and Wilkinson, S. Eugenics, Embryo Selection, and 
the Equal Value Principle, 1 Clinical Ethics 46 (2006). 
 16 The U.S. does not regulate the area because it is considered ‘research’ but the American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine has published some non-binding recommendations: 
http://www.asrm.org/?vs=1.  
 17 For a briefer commentary on Quintavalle see See Cherkassky, L., The Wrong Harvest: 
The Law on Saviour Siblings, 1 The International Journal of Law, Policy and Family, 1 (2015). 
 18 R (Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilisation Embryology Authority (and Secretary of State for 
Health), [2005] 2 A.C. 561 (H.L.) 5. 
 19 Id. at 2. 
 20 Id.  
 21 Id. at 3, 8.  
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(c) all other possibilities of treatment and sources of tissue for the affected 
child should have been explored;
22
 
(d) the technique should not be available where the intended tissue recipient 
is a parent; 
(e) the intention should be to take only blood for the purposes of the 
treatment, and not other tissues or organs; 
(f) appropriate implications counselling should be a requirement for 
couples undergoing this type of treatment; 
(g) families should be encouraged to participate in follow up studies and, 
as with PGD, clinics should provide detailed information about treatment 
cycles and their outcomes; 
(h) embryos should not be genetically modified to provide a tissue match.
23
 
 
A licence was granted to Park Hospital in Nottingham.24 Mr and Mrs 
Hashmi created a total of 25 embryos in two cycles.25 The interest group 
Comment on Reproductive Ethics (CORE) sought permission to apply 
for a judicial review on the grounds that the HFE Authority had acted 
ultra vires to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, 
presenting a unique opportunity for the courts to discuss the creation of 
saviour siblings.26 The relevant provisions from the 1990 Act are as 
follows: 
 
Section 2(1): In this act, “treatment services” means medical, surgical or 
obstetric services provided…for the purpose of assisting women to carry 
children. 
 
Section 11(1)(a): The Authority may grant licences under paragraph 1 of 
schedule 2 authorising activities in the course of treatment services. 
 
Schedule 2. 
Paragraph 1(1): A licence under this paragraph may authorise any of the 
following in the course of providing treatment services: 
                                                          
 22 A transplant from an HLA identical sibling is associated with a much higher success rate 
than a transplant from alternative donors. Humans inherit half of their HLA type from their 
mother and the other half from their father, so each sibling has a one in four chance of being 
HLA identical to one of his siblings. See Devolder, K., Pre-implantation HLA Typing: Having 
Children to Save Our Loved Ones, 31 Journal of Medical Ethics 582 (2005). 
 23 This is the original 2001 Policy, which can be found in the revised 2004 Policy document: 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Report: Preimplantation Tissue Typing. (2004), 
available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/PolicyReview_PreimplantationTissueReport.pdf.  
 24 R (Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilisation Embryology Authority (and Secretary of State for 
Health), [2005] 2 A.C. 561 (H.L.) 5. 
 25 Id.  
 26 The United Kingdom would have been the first developed country to legalise the creation 
of saviour siblings.  
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(d) practices designed to secure that embryos are in a suitable condition to 
be placed in a woman or to determine whether embryos are suitable for that 
purpose. 
 
Paragraph 1(3): A licence under this paragraph cannot authorise any 
activity unless it appears to the Authority to be necessary or desirable for 
the purposes of providing treatment services.
27
 
 
The question to be answered by the High Court was whether the 
screening of an embryo for a tissue preference was ‘necessary or 
desirable’ to ensure that it was ‘in a suitable condition’ to be placed in 
a woman for it to be ‘in the course of’ treatment services. CORE argued 
that it was not.28 Mr and Mrs Hashmi temporarily stopped treatment in 
anticipation of the judgment, handed down in R (on the application of 
Josephine Quintavalle) on behalf of CORE v Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority.29 Mr Justice Maurice Kay began by stating that 
the case was only about statutory interpretation (at paragraph 7) which 
seemed strange considering the ethical undertones of the action,30 but 
CORE was successful on the grounds that PTT did not assist women to 
carry children in the literal sense: 
 
…section 2(1) expressly defines “treatment services” by reference to a 
single purpose - that of “assisting women to carry children”. The sole 
purpose of tissue typing is to ensure that any such child would have tissue 
compatibility with its older sibling. I do not consider that it can be said to 
be “necessary or desirable” for the purpose of assisting a woman to carry a 
child. The carrying of such a child after implantation would be wholly 
unaffected by the tissue typing. It seems to me that the language of the Act 
does not bear the strain which would be necessary to read “with particular 
characteristics” into the carrying of a child.31 
 
Mr Justice Maurice Kay was of the opinion that a tissue match to a 
sibling was not necessary or desirable to assist a woman in carrying a 
child because the phrases ‘assisting’, ‘carrying’ and ‘treatment service’ 
under the 1990 Act had medical connotations. A tissue match was not a 
                                                          
 27 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, c. 37 (Eng.).  
 28 R (on the application of Josephine Quintavalle) on behalf of CORE v. Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, [2002] EWHC 2000. 
 29  Id. 
 30 The High Court has not hesitated in the past to have lengthy discussions about the social 
and ethical ramifications of a judgment. See Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 and 
Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) [2001] Fam. 147. 
 31 R (on the application of Josephine Quintavalle) on behalf of CORE v. Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, [2002] EWHC 2000, Per Justice Maurice Kay, at 
paragraph 17. 
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treatment service because it was merely a social characteristic that was 
highly subjective to the parents. Lord Wilberforce in a much earlier case 
named Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department 
of Health and Social Security stated that the role of the courts when 
interpreting a statute was to focus on the intentions of Parliament: 
 
When a new state of affairs, or a fresh set of facts bearing on policy, comes 
into existence, the courts have to consider whether they fall within the 
Parliamentary intention. The courts should be less willing to extend 
expressed meanings if it is clear that the Act in question was designed to be 
restrictive or circumscribed in its operation rather than liberal or 
permissive. [The courts] cannot fill gaps; they cannot by asking the 
question ‘What would Parliament have done in this current case – not being 
one in contemplation – if the facts had been before it?’ attempt themselves 
to supply the answer, if the answer is not to be found in the terms of the Act 
itself.
32
 
 
Lord Bingham in the more recent case of R (Quintavalle) v Secretary 
of State for Health stated clearly that the 1990 Act was intended to be 
strict in nature: 
 
It is, however, plain that while Parliament outlawed certain grotesque 
possibilities (such as placing a live animal embryo in a woman or a live 
human embryo in an animal) it otherwise opted for a strict regime of 
control. No activity within this field was left unregulated. There was to be 
no free for all.
33
 
 
The words ‘assisting’, ‘carrying’ and ‘treatment services’ under section 
2(1) of the 1990 Act are therefore likely to refer to an activity that is 
medically essential to assist a woman in carrying a child.  
 
The HFE Authority was given leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal 
on the basis that the case raised “substantial matters of public 
importance in the interest of the community…[and had] an impact on 
human life”.34 In other words, there were legal, social and ethical issues 
that needed to be discussed and the Court of Appeal was the best place 
to do it. 
 
IV. QUINTAVALLE IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 
 
                                                          
 32  [1981] A.C. 800, at page 822. 
 33 R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13 (unrelated to the current 
case but interpreting the same provisions) at paragraph 13. 
 34 Id. Mr Justice Maurice Kay, at paragraphs 7 and 20. 
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The Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the High Court and 
held in R (on the application of Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for 
Health that PTT was a treatment service for the ‘purpose of assisting 
women to carry children’ under section 2(1) of the 1990 Act and what 
was more, the word ‘suitable’ under schedule 2 paragraph 1(1)(d) was 
to be read subjectively according to the desires of the mother.35  
 
Lord Phillips MR was the first to overturn the strict interpretation of 
Mr Justice Maurice Kay: 
 
My initial reaction to the meaning of “for the purpose of assisting women 
to carry children” was the same as that of Maurice Kay J. The phrase 
naturally suggests treatment designed to assist the physical processes from 
fertilisation to the birth of a child…my conclusion is that whether the PGD 
has the purpose of producing a child free from genetic defects, or of 
producing a child with stem cells matching a sick or dying sibling, the IVF 
treatment that includes the PGD constitutes ‘treatment for the purpose of 
assisting women to bear children.
36
 
 
Lord Phillips MR admitted that the relevant provisions appeared to 
be objective but then stated that any service offered to a woman could 
be considered treatment for the purposes of assisting her to carry a child 
as long as PGD was included.37 This is a frustrating interpretation 
because PGD (screening for a defect) is quite different from PTT 
(screening for a tissue match), and it oversimplifies the technology to 
place both procedures in the same category. Lord Phillips MR turned 
his attention to ‘suitable condition’ under schedule 2 paragraph 1(1)(d) 
and decided to interpret it subjectively: 
 
Just as in the case of PGD screening for genetic defects, the meaning of 
“suitable” falls to be determined having regard to its context. When the 
object of the treatment is to enable a woman to bear a child with a tissue 
type that will enable stem cells to be provided to a sick sibling an embryo 
will only be suitable for the purpose of being placed within her if it will 
lead to the birth of a child with the tissue type in question.
38
 
 
Lord Phillips MR took the phrase ‘suitable condition’ to mean 
suitable to the preferences of the mother, which is strange because the 
wording of the provision - “practices designed to secure that embryos 
are in a suitable condition to be placed in a woman” - suggests medical 
                                                          
 35 [2003] EWCA Civ. 667 
 36 Id. at paragraphs 43 and 48. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at paragraph 49. 
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viability for a successful pregnancy, not social suitability. It is unclear 
where this subjective interpretation came from in light of such a strict 
provision, but the “object of the treatment” could now potentially 
expand to include many subjective characteristics including blue eyes, 
blond hair, perfect pitch, height, weight, metabolism and that old 
classic: sex selection. Lord Phillips MR did address the ethical issues 
briefly as if realising just how far he had expanded the ambit of the 1990 
Act by stating that he preferred to leave ethics to one side:  
 
“Whether and for what purposes such a choice should be permitted 
raises difficult ethical questions. My conclusion is that Parliament has 
placed that choice in the hands of the HFE Authority.”39 
 
It is submitted that Parliament did not intend to leave difficult ethical 
questions to the HFE Authority. The provisions of the 1990 Act are 
strict in nature because the idea of embryonic research was highly 
controversial when it was first introduced to the public, and it would 
have been unacceptable to provide eager scientists with an opportunity 
to misinterpret or manipulate the law. Embryos, for example, are not to 
be kept beyond fourteen days after the development of the primitive 
streak under section 3(4) of the 1990 Act.40 This level of detail does not 
suggest a statute that can be read subjectively depending on the context 
of the woman (or scientist) seeking services, it suggests a statute that is 
objective and restrictive in nature to control unethical practices. 
 
Lord Justice Schiemann handed down a second judgment in the 
Court of Appeal but it did not make any sense - he effectively deleted 
the ‘treatment services’ from his deliberations and worked with what he 
had left: 
 
A combination of section 2(1) and schedule 2 paragraph 1(3) reads: “A 
licence under this paragraph cannot authorise any activity unless it appears 
to the Authority to be necessary or desirable for the purpose of providing 
medical, surgical or obstetric services provided to the public or a section 
of the public for the purpose of assisting women to carry children.” All 
parties, faced with this inelegant amalgam, have proceeded on the basis that 
the issues before us can be resolved more easily by simply ignoring the 
words which I have placed in italics. I agree that this seems the most 
sensible approach. The primary question can thus be phrased: Can the 
process in issue lawfully appear to the Authority as necessary or desirable 
for the purpose of assisting a woman to carry a child?
41
 
 
                                                          
 39 Id. at paragraph 50. 
 40 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, (Eng.).   
 41 R (on the application of Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] EWCA Civ 
667 at paragraphs 74, 75 and 76. Emphasis in original. 
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In rewording the provisions in a way that was suitable for him, was 
Schiemann LJ attempting to change the nature of the statute from 
objective/medical to subjective/social? Schiemann LJ turned his eye to 
embryonic wastage, denying that it was an issue that some good 
embryos would be wasted if they were not a tissue match:  
 
It seems to me that the creation of embryos with the knowledge that some 
perfectly healthy embryos will deliberately be allowed to perish was not 
regarded by Parliament as always unacceptable. The contrary has not been 
argued. Allowing embryos which do not suffer from a genetic defect to 
perish was also not regarded by Parliament as always unacceptable. Again, 
the contrary has not been argued.
42
 
 
It is strongly submitted that Parliament, when drafting the 1990 Act, 
actually kept a close eye on embryonic wastage as a result of the 
Warnock report (1984) which requested that “the embryo of the human 
species should be afforded some protection in law”.43 There are three 
references to embryo destruction under the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990: section 3(4) demands the destruction of the 
embryo following the emergence of the primitive streak, and section 
4A(4)(b) of schedule 3 states that an embryo must be destroyed if 
consent to storage is withdrawn, and section 13(5) refers to the welfare 
of the child “to be born” (more below). The Abortion Act 1967, on a 
separate note, does not allow the social destruction of a pregnancy 
beyond twenty-four weeks because the unborn baby is close to viable (a 
provision inserted by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
1990). It is strongly submitted, therefore, that Parliament wished to limit 
embryonic wastage and the 1990 Act was a means to this end. 
 
Schiemann LJ nevertheless decided that screening for a tissue match 
came within the ambit of the 1990 Act: “In my judgment it was lawfully 
open to the Authority to come to the conclusion that the Process in Issue 
would assist some women…to carry a child.”44 
 
This was, of course, an easy conclusion to reach when the phrase ‘for 
the purpose of providing medical services’ was conveniently deleted, 
giving the provisions a social context rather than a medical one. PTT 
probably would assist a woman to carry a child if she is only seeking to 
locate a particular social characteristic in her embryos, but PTT does 
not assist a woman to carry a child if she is seeking medical assistance 
in carrying that child (as required under the 1990 Act). 
                                                          
 42 Id. at paragraphs 81 and 83. 
 43 Warnock Report, Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology, DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. SEC, July 1984, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, at 
paragraph 11.17, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/2068.html (last accessed Apr. 6 2017). 
 44 Id., at paragraph 89. 
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Schiemann LJ rounded off by inserting tissue compatibility into the 
suitability provision and made one of the most contradictory comments 
in the whole Quintavalle story: 
 
…the concept of suitability in [schedule 2] paragraph 1(1)(d) is wide 
enough to embrace ensuring that the embryo does not suffer from a genetic 
defect and tissue incompatibility… if the decision of the Authority is 
upheld in the present case it does not mean that parents have a right to in 
vitro fertilisation for social selection purposes.
45
 
 
By reading tissue incompatibility into the ‘suitable condition’ 
provision, Schiemann LJ declared that an embryo was unsuitable simply 
because it did not match its sibling. This was a highly controversial 
conclusion to draw because it inserted social selection into the 1990 Act 
as a new ground for embryo destruction. It also contradicted his final 
statement on social selection being inaccessible to parents. Parents now 
do have a right to in vitro fertilisation for social purposes because 
references to medical treatment were removed from his interpretation 
of the law and he added tissue incompatibility to the meaning of 
‘suitability’ under schedule 2 paragraph 1(1)(d). Schiemann LJ was 
denying the very “right” he had just granted. 
 
Mance LJ handed down the most interesting judgment in the Court 
of Appeal, but inadvertently caused the most confusion. Firstly he 
addressed the welfare provision under section 13(5) of the 1990 Act and 
decided that creating a sibling for the benefit of another sibling was not 
against the welfare of the child to be born: “Whilst that subsection 
probably had primarily in mind consideration of any adverse effects on 
the welfare of the future or any existing child, the language does not 
exclude positive effects.”46 
 
The full text of the welfare provision reads as follows:  
 
Section 13(5): A woman shall not be provided with treatment 
services unless account has been taken of the welfare of any child who 
may be born as a result of the treatment (including the need of that child 
for supportive parenting), and of any other child who may be affected 
by the birth.47 
 
It is a concern that the welfare provision can be so easily reversed to 
support the creation of an embryo for its blood and bone marrow. Mance 
                                                          
 45 R (on the application of Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] EWCA Civ 
667at paragraphs 96 and 98. 
 46 Id. at paragraph 133. 
 47 Id. 
 
2016] Quintavalle: The Quandry in Bioethics 175 
 
LJ may have read the welfare provision in a way that supported the child 
to be cured.48 
 
Mance LJ moved on to address the most glaring ethical issue: 
eugenics.  He admitted that there is a difference between screening out 
abnormalities and screening in preferences but he denied that the 
Hashmi family had a choice: 
 
The crucial distinction has been put as being between “screening out 
abnormalities” and “screening in preferences”. That distinction raises a 
spectre of eugenics and “designer babies”. But it is a crude over-
simplification to view this case as being about “preferences”. The word 
suggests personal indulgence or predilection and the luxury of a real choice. 
But there is no element of whim in the circumstances that the HFE 
Authority had it in mind to licence in December 2001, and Mr and Mrs 
Hashmi are not seeking to indulge themselves. The case is about a family’s 
reaction, understandable in the light of current scientific possibilities, to a 
cruel fate which one of its members is suffering and will continue to suffer, 
without a successful stem cell transplant.
49
 
 
Mance LJ added that the facts in the Hashmi case were anything but 
“purely social”: 
 
There are here good medical reasons for screening any embryo, although 
they do not relate to any future child’s health. The concerns to which the 
HFEA’s decision and the licence for Mr and Mrs Hashmi are directed are 
anything but “purely social”, relating as they do to the health of a sibling 
and the wellbeing of the whole family. What matters in any event is that 
the Warnock committee proposed in Chap. 9.11 of its report to leave even 
the general question of the acceptability of sex selection to the authority 
which it recommended should be established…the present circumstances 
involve a form of selection which is much less obviously problematic than, 
and very far removed from, selection for social purposes.
50
 
 
There are two quotes above that cause confusion. Firstly, Mance LJ 
was clearly of the opinion that screening in preferences was acceptable 
because Mr. and Mrs. Hashmi were not merely “indulging in luxury” 
                                                          
 48 There is a feeling amongst writers that the welfare provision under section 13(5) is not 
effective anyway because no one can enforce it: see Jackson, E., Conception and the Irrelevance 
of the Welfare Principle, 65 MOD. L. REV., 176,176 (2002), and Cherkassky, L., The Wrong 
Harvest: The Law on Saviour Siblings, 1 The International Journal of Law, Policy and Family, 
1 (2015). 
 49 R (on the application of Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] EWCA Civ 
667at paragraph 134. 
 50 Id. at paragraphs 135 and 143. Emphasis added. 
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but sought to protect the “wellbeing of the whole family”, but it is 
submitted that using the technology to locate an embryo for a particular 
characteristic is an indulgence and it is a luxury. An expensive one. The 
“cruel fate” and “suffering” bestowed upon their existing child does not 
turn the voluntary use of the technology into a necessity. It is not a 
treatment service to assist the carriage of a child in the medical sense 
under section 2(1) of the 1990 Act. Secondly, Mance LJ admitted that 
screening in preferences did not relate to the health of the embryo, but 
he still denied that it was a “purely social” use of the technology. In 
light of the subsequent ban on sex selection for social purposes under 
schedule 2 paragraph 1ZB of the 1990 Act which states:  
 
“…a licence cannot authorise any practice designed to secure that a 
resulting child will be of one sex rather than the other, unless there is a 
particular risk that a woman will give birth to a child who will develop 
a gender-related physical or mental disability or disease…” 
 
it is likely that Parliament did not intend for embryos to be selected 
or destroyed on any ground other than medical reasons.51 
 
Mance LJ turned his attention to the definition of ‘treatment services’ 
and decided that screening in a tissue preference could constitute such 
a service under section 2(1):  
 
…once it is recognised that the concept of “services for the purpose of 
assisting women to carry children” extends beyond purely physical 
problems affecting the viability of the embryo during pregnancy and 
birth…it becomes clear that such services may have regard to prospective 
parents’ and society’s concern for others and for the future. The concept is 
in other words to be read in a general, rather than a restrictive sense…I have 
further concluded that a biopsy for the purpose of tissue typing and of 
enabling a choice to be made regarding implantation based on the 
compatibility of the embryo’s tissue with that of a sibling is capable of 
constituting a service for the purpose of assisting women to carry 
children.
52
 
 
This definition of ‘treatment services’ was rather puzzling because 
section 2(1) clearly states:  
 
In this act, “treatment services” means medical, surgical or obstetric 
services provided for the purpose of assisting women to carry children. 
 
                                                          
 51 Confusingly, the screening in of preferences was frequently c ompared to sex selection (a 
well-known method of social selection) throughout the Court of Appeal judgment R (on the 
application of Josephine Quintavalle) on behalf of CORE v Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority, [2002] EWHC 2000, at paragraphs 27, 124, 135, 140 and 143. 
 52 Id. at paragraphs 142 and 145. 
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Mance LJ disposed of the words ‘medical, surgical or obstetric’ and 
replaced them with social preferences. Parliament did not intend for 
section 2(1) to be read in a wider social context because it very clearly 
defines “treatment services” as medical, surgical or obstetric services 
which do not extend beyond the “purely physical problems affecting the 
viability of the embryo” (as per Mance LJ). Therefore, as a result of 
Mance LJ interpreting treatment services as a wider social service, the 
screening in of a tissue preference is confirmed as social selection.  
 
The Court of Appeal was clearly content to widen the scope of the 
1990 Act to allow the HFE Authority to authorise PTT as an activity in 
the course of treatment services for the purpose of assisting women to 
carry children under section 2(1). The suitable condition of the embryo 
under schedule 2 paragraph 1(1)(d) was given a wider social meaning 
to support the desires of the mother. She was not indulging in luxury, 
she had no choice (per Mance LJ). The medical connotations were 
removed from the relevant provisions and replaced by the wellbeing of 
the family as a whole (per Schiemann LJ and Mance LJ). The lords 
effectively placed PTT in the social selection category despite strong 
denials that social selection was taking place, permitting a mother to 
select or destroy her healthy embryos simply because they did or did 
not not match her existing child.  
 
Notwithstanding a Court of Appeal judgment beset with confusion 
and contradiction, the common law had changed. Mr and Mrs Hashmi 
restarted their PTT treatment in May 2003 but a pregnancy did not 
result.53 Mr and Mrs Whitaker, who had made an identical plea to the 
HFE Authority at the same time as Mr and Mrs Hashmi but were 
rejected on the grounds that their son’s disease diamond blackfan 
anaemia was sporadic rather than hereditary according to the original 
PTT policy published in 2001 (above), travelled to the Chicago 
Reproductive Institute which first pioneered the procedure and 
successfully gave birth to Jamie Whitaker in June 2003. He was 
ironically heralded as “Britain’s first saviour sibling”54 but concerns 
were raised that the technology was going too far by a spokesman for 
LIFE: 
 
To create another child as a transplant source, however, could set a 
dangerous precedent for uses of this kind of technology. How will baby 
James feel, for example, when he discovers that he was brought into the 
world to supply ‘spare parts’ for his elder brother?55 
 
                                                          
 53 Mr and Mrs Hashmi underwent six trials of IVF with PTT and created 25 embryos, but 
were ultimately unsuccessful in establishing a pregnancy. BioNews, Hashmis Fail in ‘Saviour 
Sibling’ Attempt, Issue 266 (13 July 2004), http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_12031.asp.  
 54 Dobson, R. Saviour Sibling is Born After Embryo Selection in the United States, -326 
BRIT. MED. J., 1416, 1416 (2003). 
 55 Patrick Cusworth, LIFE charity spokesman, quoted in the article cited in fn. 33 above. 
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The HFE Authority, in light of the Whitaker development and the 
newly found freedom in R (on the application of Quintavalle) v 
Secretary of State for Health, decided to take another look at its PTT 
policy and announced two changes in 2004: 
 
1. PTT can be offered in cases where the embryo is not at risk from 
the condition affecting the existing child; 
 
2. Depending on the needs of the existing child, it can be acceptable 
to offer PTT with a view to harvesting bone marrow.56 
 
The changes were justified by the HFE Authority on the following 
grounds: 
 
Faced with potential requests from parents who want to save a sick child, 
the emotional focus is understandably on the child who is ill. Our job is 
also to consider the welfare of the tissue matched child which will be born. 
Our review of the evidence does not indicate that the embryo biopsy 
procedure disadvantages resulting babies compared to other IVF babies.
57
 
 
The 2004 changes expanded the original 2001 policy considerably. 
Parents no longer needed to screen their embryos for hereditary defects, 
disabilities or disorders in order to use PTT, turning PGD/HLA into a 
purely subjective/social procedure. CORE was granted an appeal to the 
House of Lords in 2005. It was the final opportunity for the judiciary to 
clear up the following legal, social and ethical loopholes that were 
created by the Court of Appeal: 
 
• the 1990 Act was designed to be interpreted in a strictly 
objective/medical sense;  
• the true meaning of ‘treatment service’ under section 2(1) did 
not include the creation of embryos for social purposes; 
• the welfare of the saviour child (not the sick child) could be 
offered some protection under section 13(5) of the 1990 Act;  
• the phrase ‘suitable condition’ under schedule 2 paragraph 
1(1)(d) was not subjective and did not support the social 
selection of embryos; 
• there was a much higher risk of embryonic wastage;  
• the introduction of social selection under the 1990 Act paved the 
way for eugenics in the future; 
                                                          
 56 [2003] EWCA Civ 667; Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Report: 
Preimplantation Tissue Typing. (2004). http://www.hfea.gov.uk/515.html, last accessed Apr. 6 
2017, at paragraph 37. 
 57 Suzi Leather, who was the Chair of the HFE Authority at the time, 21st July 2004. The 
original press release is on the official website: www.hfea.gov.uk/763.html (last accessed Apr 
6, 2017). 
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• it was not in the best interests of a very young donor child to 
undergo a non-therapeutic harvesting procedure. 
 
It is worth noting a particularly unpleasant statement in the revised 
PTT Report (2004) to demonstrate why the House of Lords judgment 
was so important to the welfare of the saviour sibling: 
 
“…should the existing child relapse, there is likely to be insufficient 
time to go through the process of creating a tissue-matched sibling. If 
such a sibling existed already, tissue that could be used in treatment 
would then be at hand if and when required.”58 
 
In light of the ‘commodity’ feel to the newly published guidelines, it 
would have been damaging for the House of Lords to uphold the 
decision of the Court of Appeal. 
 
V. QUINTAVALLE IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
 
The House of Lords upheld the decision in the Court of Appeal in R 
(Quintavalle) v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (and 
Secretary of State for Health), choosing to bypass matters of law, 
harvest, eugenics, welfare and ethics to focus solely on statutory 
interpretation.59  
 
Lord Hoffman handed down the main judgment, starting with the 
difficulty presented by ‘suitability’: 
 
The claimant [CORE] says that this gives far too wide a meaning to the 
notion of being suitable. It would enable the authority to authorise a single 
cell biopsy to test the embryo for whatever characteristics the mother might 
wish to know: whether the child would be male or female, dark or blonde, 
perhaps even, in time to come, intelligent or stupid. Suitable must therefore 
have a narrower meaning than suitable for that particular mother.
60
 
 
Despite the valid points raised by CORE, Lord Hoffman decided that 
the phrase ‘suitable condition’ should be interpreted as widely as 
possible: 
 
‘Suitable’ is one of those adjectives which leaves its content to be 
determined entirely by context…[The Authority] may consider that 
allowing the mother to select an embryo on such grounds is undesirable on 
                                                          
 58 Id., at page 9, paragraph 34, emphasis added. 
 59 2 A.C. 561 [2005]. 
 60 Id. at paragraph 13. 
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ethical or other grounds. But the breadth of the concept of suitability is what 
determines the breadth of the authority’s discretion.61 
 
Lord Hoffman was of the opinion that the HFE Authority had 
complete discretion over the meaning of ‘suitable condition’ because of 
the comments in the Warnock Report (1984) regarding sex selection: 
 
…the Warnock Report…went on to consider the use of gender 
identification to select the sex of a child “for purely social reasons”…the 
committee said that…“the whole question of the acceptability of sex 
selection should be kept under review”. The committee [also] said: “the 
authority should be specifically charged with the responsibility to regulate 
and monitor practice in relation to those sensitive areas which raise 
fundamental ethical questions”. The conclusion which I draw is that the 
committee contemplated that the authority would decide the circumstances, 
if any, in which sex selection on social grounds should be authorised. As 
sex selection on social grounds is the most obvious case of selecting an 
embryo on grounds other than its health, I would infer that the Warnock 
committee did not intend that selection of IVF embryos on grounds which 
went beyond genetic abnormality should be altogether banned.
62
 
 
Lord Hoffman inadvertently stated that PTT was not connected to 
the health of the embryo providing an explanation for the constant 
references to sex selection in both appeal courts: they are clearly both 
methods of social selection. To put it in stark terms, if PTT can 
accurately be said to be an ‘activity in the course of 
medical/surgical/obstetric treatment services’ to be licenced under 
section 11(1)(a) then it is neither here nor there that the Warnock Report 
left sex selection - a widely known social preference - to the discretion 
of the HFE Authority. Lord Hoffman then felt free to announce that 
‘suitable condition’ was to be read subjectively according to the desires 
of the mother: 
 
…there was no proposal [in the White Paper: Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology: A Framework for Legislation, November 1987 (Cm 259)] to 
include in the “clearly prohibited” list the testing of embryos to enable the 
mother to choose to carry a child with characteristics of her choice…Thus, 
if the concept of suitability is broad enough to include suitability for the 
purposes of the particular mother, it seems to me clear enough that the 
activity of determining the genetic characteristics of the embryo by way of 
PGD or HLA typing would be “in the course of” providing the mother with 
IVF services and that the authority would be entitled to take the view that 
it was necessary or desirable for the purpose of providing such 
                                                          
 61 Id. at paragraph 14. 
 62 Id. at paragraphs 16, 17 and 19 (emphasis added). 
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services…the word ‘suitable’ is an empty vessel which is filled with 
meaning by context and background.
63 
 
 
Lord Hoffman with this paragraph authorised the creation of saviour 
siblings in the United Kingdom. However, it is submitted that he 
focused too heavily on section 11 of the 1990 Act, which states: 
 
Section 11(1)(a): The Authority may grant licences under paragraph 
1 of schedule 2 authorising activities in the course of treatment services. 
 
It is probably acceptable to say that PTT is an activity in the course 
of PGD and therefore the HFE Authority have discretion to licence it, 
but under section 2(1) treatment services are defined as ‘medical, 
surgical or obstetric’ placing an emphasis on medical viability. 
Additionally, ‘suitable condition’ under schedule 2 paragraph 1(1)(d) 
refers to the medical status of the embryo (i.e. free from defect or 
disease), not an empty vessel to be filled by the social desires of the 
mother. Lord Hoffman appears to be setting some of the relevant 
provisions to one side in his interpretation of the law. It is highly 
unlikely that during the construction of the 1990 Act Parliament wished 
to leave the question of whether or not to create a baby for its social 
characteristics (i.e. eugenics) to the licencing authority. It is simply too 
controversial. 
 
Lord Hoffman finished his judgment on a rather strange note, 
concluding that should the best interests of the potential child be in any 
doubt, “a ruling from the court may be obtained”.64 This was his only 
reference to the more pressing issue of the legitimate harvesting of 
young children for their bone marrow: 
 
I have no doubt that medical practitioners take very seriously the law that 
any operation upon a child for which there is no clinical reason relating to 
the child itself must be justified as being for other reasons in the child’s 
best interests…The authority is in my opinion entitled to assume that a child 
conceived pursuant to its licence will, after birth, receive the full protection 
of the law.
65
 
 
By stating that issues of welfare will be dealt with after birth, Lord 
Hoffman moved the ethical responsibility of creating babies for harvest 
away from the HFE Authority and thrust it into welfare law (the 
Children Act 1989) and transplant law (the Human Tissue Act 2004). 
These three areas of practice (fertility, welfare and transplant) do not sit 
                                                          
 63 Emphasis added, Id. at paragraphs 22, 24 and 33. 
 64 Id. at paragraphs 35 and 38. 
 65 Id. at paragraph 38. 
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separately - they are intricately tied to each other as a result of 
Quintavalle. There is no point in helping parents to select embryos with 
a tissue preference if the harvesting procedure after birth does not 
support the welfare of the child. Lord Hoffman did not address this legal 
loophole, preferring instead to maintain that the HFE Authority was to 
“grapple with such issues” at its discretion.66 The proof of this 
discretion, in his opinion, was the fact that Parliament excluded sex 
selection from the original 1990 Act: 
 
The authority was specifically created to make ethical distinctions 
and, if Parliament should consider it to be failing in that task, it has in 
reserve its regulatory powers under section 3(3)(c)…Perhaps the most 
telling indication that parliament did not intend to confine the 
authority’s powers to unsuitability on grounds of genetic defects is the 
absence of any reference in the Act to selection on grounds of sex…It 
is hard to imagine that the reason why the Act said nothing on the 
subject was because Parliament thought it was clearly prohibited by the 
use of the word ‘suitable’ or because it wanted to leave the question 
over for later primary legislation. In my opinion the only reasonable 
inference is that parliament intended to leave the matter to the authority 
to decide.67 
 
It is submitted that Parliament did not refer to sex selection in the 
1990 Act because the provisions were already strict enough to exclude 
every kind of social selection. Once again, the HFE Authority’s 
perceived discretion over sex selection is used to justify the inclusion of 
PTT into the 1990 Act, placing both procedures into the ‘social 
selection’ category. 
 
Lord Brown delivered the smaller judgment in the House of Lords 
and began by turning an eye to the bigger ethical issues: 
 
The ethical questions raised by such a process are, it need hardly be stated, 
profound. Should genetic testing be used to enable a choice to be made 
between a number of healthy embryos, a choice based on the selection of 
certain preferred genetic characteristics?...Is this straying into the field of 
“designer babies” or - as the celebrated geneticist Lord Winston, has put it, 
“treating the offspring to be born as a commodity”.68 
 
It is clear that Quintavalle was not merely a case about statutory 
interpretation - there were social and ethical problems to discuss too, 
especially the legality of the subsequent harvest upon the donor child. 
                                                          
 66 Id. at paragraph 26. This is nonsense because the HFE Authority have nothing to do with 
the saviour child after it has been born. 
 67 Id. at paragraphs 28 and 29. 
 68 Id. at paragraph 43. 
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However, Lord Brown quickly reigned in his enthusiasm for ethical 
issues by stating that the “sole concern” of the House of Lords was 
merely to decide whether the 1990 Act allowed the HFE Authority to 
licence tissue typing,69 and instead turned to ‘suitability’ with a 
supporting comment for the appellant Josephine Quintavalle:  
 
Initially, I confess to having found some considerable force in the 
claimant’s argument that PGD screening is one thing, and properly 
licensable under the 1990 Act, tissue typing a completely different concept 
and impermissible. It is one thing to enable a woman to conceive and bear 
a child which will itself be free of genetic abnormality; quite another to 
bear a child specifically selected for the purpose of treating someone else. 
One can read into the statutory purpose specified by section 2(1), that of 
“assisting women to carry children”, the notion of healthy children - only a 
genetically healthy embryo being “suitable” for placing in the woman 
within the meaning of paragraph 1(1)(d).
70
 
 
Despite this admission that the provisions were strictly 
objective/medical in nature, Lord Brown frustratingly turned back to sex 
selection and drew strength from the fact that the Warnock Report left 
sex selection “under review”: 
 
The [Warnock] committee, at paragraph 9.11, expressly envisaged the 
future possibility of sex selection “for purely social reasons” and concluded 
that “the whole question of the acceptability of sex selection should be kept 
under review” - review which inferentially was to be undertaken by a 
proposed new statutory licencing authority established “to regulate and 
monitor practice in relation to those sensitive areas which raise fundamental 
ethical questions” at paragraph 13.3.71  
 
Tissue typing had been denied on many occasions throughout the 
appeal courts as emulating the social selection of embryos, including 
this strong statement by Lord Brown himself: 
 
In the unlikely event that the Authority were to propose licencing genetic 
selection for purely social reasons, Parliament would surely act at once to 
remove that possibility, doubtless using for the purpose the regulation 
making power under section 3(3)(c). Failing that, in an extreme case the 
court’s supervisory jurisdiction could be invoked.72 
                                                          
 69 Id. at paragraph 46. 
 70 Id. at paragraph 51. 
 71 Id. at paragraph 53. 
 72 Id. at paragraph 62. Lord Hoffmann made an almost identical statement at paragraph 28. 
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The frequent comparisons to sex selection in both appeal courts 
therefore gives a very strong impression that tissue typing is a form of 
social selection and the lords are having to draw parallels between PTT 
and sex selection in order to justify its inclusion in the strict provisions 
of the 1990 Act. 
 
Lord Brown finished his contradictory judgment with an even more 
baffling reason to authorise tissue typing: 
 
I was at one time attracted to [the] dividing line between selection aimed 
purely at eliminating serious genetic or chromosome defects (permissible) 
and other selective criteria (impermissible). As, however, Lord Hoffman 
points out, what amounts to a serious genetic defect will itself often be 
contentious.
73
 
 
Lord Brown, in an attempt to authorise PTT, suggested that the line 
between ‘serious defects’ and ‘selective criteria’ was ambiguous. It is 
agreed that some defects, disabilities or diseases are not as harmful as 
others (i.e. partial deafness vs. diamond blackfan anaemia), but a very 
clear line can be drawn between genetic conditions and preferred 
characteristics. A tissue match to a sibling is not a genetic defect, nor 
does it assist a woman to carry a child in the medical sense, so is Lord 
Brown suggesting that a non-matching embryo is defective, disabled or 
diseased? This would be highly controversial and could lead to wasteful 
embryonic destruction. Lord Brown goes further, reducing PGD to a 
social, as opposed to a medical, procedure:  
 
PGD with a view to producing a healthy child assists a woman to carry a 
child only in the sense that it helps her decide whether the embryo is 
“suitable” and whether she will bear the child. Whereas, however, 
suitability is for the woman, the limits of permissible embryo selection are 
for the authority.
74
 
This statement appears to be judicial confirmation that suitability is 
subjective and that embryos can be selected for purely social reasons. 
PGD was, however, developed to screen embryos for genetic diseases 
as opposed to tissue match to suit the desires of the mother. 
 
The House of Lords were content to close their brief judgment at this 
point, failing to address the legal, social and ethical and consequences 
of their controversial decision. Tissue typing is now a ‘treatment 
service’ for the ‘purpose of assisting women to carry children’ under 
section 2(1) of the 1990 Act and what is more, the suitability of the 
                                                          
 73 Id. at paragraph 61. 
 74 Id. at paragraph 62. 
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embryos under schedule 2 paragraph 1(1)(d) is subjective according to 
the desires of the mother. In social terms, it is now possible to ‘design’ 
a saviour sibling by screening in a preferred tissue match and destroy 
any remaining embryos on the grounds that they do not match this 
personal preference.  
 
It is highly unlikely that the legitimacy of tissue typing will ever be 
questioned now that it is enshrined into statute: 
 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 
 
Schedule 2: Activities that may be licenced under the 1990 Act. 
Paragraph 1ZA(1): A licence…cannot authorise the testing of an embryo, 
except for one or more of the following purposes: 
(d) in a case where a person (“the sibling”) who is the child of the persons 
whose gametes are used to bring about the creation of the embryo (or of 
either of those persons) suffers from a serious medical condition which 
could be treated by umbilical cord blood stem cells, bone marrow or other 
tissue of any resulting child, establishing whether the tissue of any resulting 
child would be compatible with that of the sibling. 
 
As a result of the judgment in Quintavalle, embryos created to save 
a sibling are now stuck in even more legal loopholes:  
 
• on what ground can the appeal courts justify the change in 
character of the 1990 Act from objective/medical to 
subjective/social despite its strict provisions? 
• is it acceptable to destroy embryos for their social 
characteristics when there are legal provisions in place to 
offer protection to embryos?  
• how does the screening in of a social preference constitute an 
activity in the course of medical, surgical or obstetric 
treatment services under section 2(1) of the 1990 Act?  
• on what grounds can ‘suitable condition’ to ‘assist’ a woman 
to carry a child under schedule 2 paragraph 1(1)(d) be read to 
support the social selection of embryos? 
• does the welfare test under section 13(5) protect an embryo 
from being destroyed for social purposes, or from being 
selected for harvesting purposes, or both? Or neither?  
• on what grounds can the HFE Authority exercise such 
sweeping ethical discretion?  
• why do the lords deny that screening in preferences 
constitutes the social selection of embryos when the liberal 
attitude towards sex selection in the Warnock Report (1984) 
formed the basis for their decision to incorporate PTT into 
the 1990 Act?  
• has the inclusion of social selection under the 1990 Act paved 
the way for eugenics in the future? 
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• can the matching sibling, once born, be legally harvested for 
its bone marrow under the Human Tissue Act 2004? 
 
The Court of Appeal and the House of Lords had the opportunity to 
address these legal loopholes but instead reverted responsibility back to 
the HFE Authority.75 
 
The biggest concern is the legitimacy of the bone marrow harvest 
upon the donor child once born. This unique non-therapeutic procedure 
has not yet been authorised by the courts and the lords did not further 
investigate the welfare of the donor child. The saviour sibling could well 
be ‘unusable’ until she is much older and able to consent for herself, by 
which time it may be too late.76 
 
VI. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE AFTER QUINTAVALLE 
 
Looking at the Quintavalle story as a whole, it appears that both 
appeal courts placed tissue typing in the same category as sex selection 
to confirm that the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority does 
have discretion to licence PTT as an activity in the course of treatment 
services under s.11(1)(a) of the 1990 Act. The House of Lords attached 
to this decision a guarantee that should the HFE Authority ever 
authorise the selection of embryos for ‘purely social reasons’ the 
legislature would act immediately to shut the practice down (at 
paragraphs 28 and 62). This is a remarkable contradiction. PTT is 
clearly a method of social selection, so why was its social nature denied? 
 
The welfare loophole is just as confusing. The 1990 Act contains a 
welfare provision under section 13(5) but the prospective child 
(according to Lord Hoffman) is protected by law after birth under the 
Children Act 1989, leaving the Human Tissue Authority to bear the 
brunt of the ethical issues of harvesting very young donors. 
 
Embryonic wastage was not addressed in any detail by the lords, 
despite the mother now being able to destroy healthy embryos simply 
because they do not match a sibling. Embryos are protected from harm 
and wasteful destruction under section 3(4), section 4A(4)(b) and 
section 13(5) of the 1990 Act and section 1(1)(a) of the Abortion Act 
1967. Quintavalle inadvertently created a new and unregulated ground 
upon which to socially destroy healthy embryos.  The biggest legal 
loophole of all, however, is the legitimacy of harvesting a baby, toddler 
or young child for her bone marrow. What is the current legal position 
should a couple come forward and ask for a saviour sibling?  
                                                          
 75 There are examples of the House of Lords refusing to discuss the ethical issues at 
paragraphs 20, 26, 29, 39, 46, 48, 55, 56 and 58 of the judgment. 
 76 The Human Tissue Authority have jurisdiction over this matter which is outside the ambit 
of this article, but it is the next issue to be explored by the author. 
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The only saviour sibling authority in the UK is Re Y (Mental Patient: 
Bone Marrow Donation)77 and it uses the interfamilial principle to 
justify a bone marrow harvest upon an incompetent adult.78 This would 
not be appropriate for children,whose needs are paramount under 
section 1(3) of the Children Act 198979. Re Y was underpinned by the 
US case of Curran v Bosze (1990) which stated that for bone marrow 
harvests upon children there must be an ‘existing relationship’ between 
siblings:  
 
The psychological benefit is grounded firmly in the fact that the donor and 
recipient are known to each other as family. Only where there is an existing 
relationship between a healthy child and his or her ill sister or brother may 
a psychological benefit to the child from donating bone marrow to a sibling 
realistically be found to exist.
80
 
 
Calvo J was also of the opinion that it could be as much as twenty 
years before the psychological benefits of a bone marrow donation are 
felt by a donor child,81 and the benefit was not to be “one of personal, 
individual altruism in an abstract, theoretical sense”.82 He also 
suggested that the benefit should be present at the time of the harvest - 
not in the future to retrospectively justify the harvest - because intention 
could not be supplied after the fact.83 Additionally, the age of the minor 
was important to the validity of the procedure in law: 
 
[It is] not possible to discover the child’s likely treatment/non-treatment 
preferences by examining the child’s philosophical, religious and moral 
views, life goals, values about the purpose of life and the way it should be 
lived, and attitudes toward sickness, medical procedures, suffering and 
death…at the age of three and a half.84 
 
                                                          
 77 [1997] Fam. 110. 
 78 Id. Per Connell J, at pages 115-116. 
 79 Children Act 1989 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/41/
contents.  
 80 566 N.E.2d 1319 Per Calvo J, at pages 1343-4. 
 81 Id. at page 1335.  
 82 Id. at page 1343 
 83 Id. at page 1336. 
 84 Id. Per Calvo J at pages 1343, 1344, 1319, 1326 and 1336. Bosze (the father) argued in 
response that if the sick sibling was kept alive, the donor children (twins) would have the 
opportunity to get to know him. This speculative future benefit did not hold any weight in court. 
The sick sibling eventually died of leukemia. 
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The notion that a psychological benefit must be tangible and proven 
at the time of the non-therapeutic procedure is supported by Butler-
Sloss LJ in Re A (Male Sterilisation): 
 
“In my judgment best interests encompasses medical, emotional and all 
other welfare issues…An operation to sterilise has to be demonstrated 
to be in the best interests of the person unable to consent. The case has 
to be proved.”85 
 
In addition to Curran v Bosze and Re A, there are other medical cases 
that support the welfare of the donor child. For example, the plight of 
the saviour sibling cannot be balanced against the plight of the sick 
sibling unless both siblings are warded at the same time, this was 
confirmed in Court of Appeal [1993] and Birmingham City Council v H 
(A Minor).86 Additionally, the consent of the parents to the non-
therapeutic procedure is not decisive.87 The parents can also not 
subsume the rights of the saviour child into their own to control her 
medical care.88 
 
Therefore, without absolute proof that the saviour child (not the 
wider family or the sick child) will experience a tangible psychological 
benefit at the time of the harvest, the procedure is not legitimate in law. 
It would be a trespass to her person and would not serve her best 
interests. Balancing acts, substituted judgments, parental consent and 
retrospective benefits do not validate the procedure. Parents may be free 
in fertility law to create their own saviour sibling, but it does not mean 
that the sibling can be harvested after birth.89 The lords in Quintavalle 
should have addressed this matter. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
                                                          
 85 [2000] 1 F.L.R. 549, at page 555. Emphasis added. 
 86 [Court of Appeal [1993] 1 FLR 883 and Birmingham City Council v H (A Minor) [1994] 
2 AC 212] 
 87 As seen in Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1421, Re 
K.D. (A Minor) (Ward: Termination of Access) [1988] A.C. 806, Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: 
Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam. 33, Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1992] 2 
FCR 219, Re Z (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [1997] Fam. 1 and Wyatt v 
Portsmouth Hospital NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 1811. 
 88  Re C (A Child) (HIV Test) [2000] Fam. 48.  
 89 For a rigorous examination of welfare law in the context of donor children, see 
Cherkassky L., Children and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, Medical Law International, 
(2015), vol. 1, 1-23. 
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Quintavalle introduced the social selection of embryos into law on 
contradictory grounds.90 Mr Justice Maurice Kay in the High Court 
interpreted the 1990 Act in a literal sense and concluded that tissue 
match to a sibling was not necessary or desirable to assist a woman in 
carrying a child. It is submitted that this was the correct approach in 
light of the earlier discussions in Royal College of Nursing of the United 
Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security and Quintavalle 
that the 1990 Act was intended to be strict in nature.91 
 
The Court of Appeal ended up raising more questions than it did 
answers, owing to the unexpected wide interpretation of the 1990 Act 
and its silence on welfare, eugenics, embryo wastage and the lawfulness 
of the subsequent harvest. Phrases that caused particular concern were 
those of Lord Phillips MR, who stated that ‘suitable condition’ under 
section 2(1) was to refer to the purpose of the treatment, including the 
search for a tissue match. This idea would have introduced widespread 
eugenics if the House of Lords had adopted it. Schiemann LJ removed 
the phrase ‘medical treatment’ from the provisions for convenience, 
changing the tone of the 1990 Act from objective/medical to 
subjective/social. He also (rather confusingly) denied that parents have 
a right to social selection in the same breath as he read tissue 
compatibility into ‘suitable condition’. Mance LJ removed ‘medical, 
surgical or obstetric’ from his interpretation of ‘treatment services’ 
under section 2(1) to support the plight of Mr & Mrs Hashmi, and 
inadvertently accepted PGD/PTT as a social procedure when he stated 
that it cared for the “wellbeing of the whole family”. He merely 
confused matters when he then denied that selecting a tissue match was 
a “purely social” use of the technology. 
 
In the House of Lords, Lord Hoffman focussed heavily on section 11 
(the power to licence activities), largely shelving the provisions of 
‘suitability’, ‘treatment services’ and ‘assisting’ under sections 2(1) and 
schedule 2 paragraph 1(1)(d) of the 1990 Act. Suitability was assigned 
to the mother without proper explanation, and he separated fertility law 
from welfare and transplant law by stating that the saviour child is 
protected after birth. The ambiguous handling of sex selection by the 
Warnock Report was also evidence, according to Lord Hoffman, of the 
discretion afforded to the HFE Authority to licence PTT, but sex 
selection for social reasons is now explicitly banned by the reforming 
2008 Act (now schedule 2 paragraph 1ZB of the 1990 Act) leaving this 
perceived openness to social selection highly unlikely. Lord Brown 
focussed on sex selection and the Warnock Report too.  
 
                                                          
 90 [R (Quintavalle) v Human Fertilisation Embryology Authority (and Secretary of State for 
Health) [2005] 2 A.C. 561] 
 91 Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social 
Security [1981] A.C. 800 and R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13]. 
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In the end, the House of Lords merely raised even more questions 
with its baffling interpretation of the law and its refusal to address any 
of the queries created by the Court of Appeal. 
 
The common law in the UK and the US in Curran v Bosze92 makes 
it clear that the welfare of the saviour sibling is paramount, and a 
tangible psychiatric benefit must be proven at the time of the bone 
marrow harvest for the donor child to benefit from it. In babies, toddlers 
and very young children, this is probably not possible. 
 
It is concluded that only the beginning of the saviour sibling process 
(i.e. the selection of the matching embryo using PTT) is lawful under 
schedule 2 paragraph 1ZA(1)(d) of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 (as amended) and even then, the roots of this 
provision are based on a confusing misinterpretation of the relevant 
provisions in Quintavalle, particularly ‘suitable condition’ under 
schedule 2 paragraph 1(1)(a) and ‘treatment services’ and ‘assisting’ 
under section 2(1).93 The Human Tissue Authority have published 
guidelines on bone marrow donations from minors but the decision to 
harvest is taken in-house without court approval as long as both parents 
consent.94 This is staggering considering the lack of judicial precedent. 
Parents are therefore free in law to create their own saviour sibling, 
cannot yet harvest that child in law, but proceed under the ambit of the 
Human Tissue Authority anyway (Figure 1): 
 
Statistics from the Human Tissue Authority (as of January 
2015)95 
Year Child bone 
marrow/blood stem 
cell cases approved 
Cases rejected 
2007 - 2008 71 0 
2008 - 2009 57 0 
2009 - 2010 78 0 
2010 - 2011 67 0 
2011 - 2012 68 0 
2012 - 2013 69 0 
2013 - 2014 78 0 
 
                                                          
 92 Curran v Bosze (1990) 566 N.E.2d 1319. 
 93 R (Quintavalle) v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (and Secretary of State 
for Health) [2005] 2 A.C. 561]. 
 94 Code of Practice G: Donation of Allogeneic Bone Marrow and Peripheral Blood Stem 
Cells for Transplantation. (2017). Human Tissue Authority. www.hta.gov.uk, at paragraphs 48 
and 77. 
 95 These statistics were requested from the Human Tissue Authority by the writer under the 
Data Protection Act in January 2015 and delivered via email. 
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The guidelines published by the Human Tissue Authority now require 
an urgent rigorous analysis. In the meantime, should the courts approve 
a bone marrow harvest upon a child in the near future, their 
interpretation of the law of welfare should be very interesting. 
 
 
